

18 APR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Cost Estimate for Facilities Modifications
Related to Study Group Recommendations
on a Consolidated Operations Center,
Headquarters Building

1. This memorandum is for your information only, as requested by the Assistant Deputy Director for Management and Services.

2. The subject study group recommendations contemplate three phases of activity. These phases are related to facilities changes as follows:

a. Phase I: No additional space required. Existing LDX equipment and some offices would be relocated within the existing area.

b. Phase II: Sixth floor space now occupied by VASRAC would accrue to the Operations Center. Additional space, as required up to a total [] square feet, would be assigned from DD/I space on the seventh floor, F Corridor. The Special Systems Operations Center, OEL, and FMSAC centers on the first floor would be relocated to the existing VASRAC area.

c. Phase III: This "ultimate" Operations Center configuration is insufficiently defined to permit relation to facilities requirements.

3. Cost estimates for facilities modifications for Phases I and II above, have been prepared; Phase III cannot be estimated because of lack of definition of the scope of work.

a. Phase I facilities work is estimated at \$35,000 (this estimate is included in the subject report). Work includes partition changes and rehabilitation of the existing air-conditioning system.

UL 3 2261

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Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86-01019R000100210001-1

SUBJECT: Cost Estimate for Facilities Modifications Related to
Study Group Recommendations on a Consolidated Operations
Center, Headquarters Building

b. Phase II facilities work is estimated at \$265,000, plus an additional \$55,000 if an internal staircase is required as stated in the report. Total facilities cost then becomes \$320,000, plus an estimate of \$50,000 to \$80,000 for communications installation and connection (prepared by the Office of Communications) with a resultant total estimated cost of \$400,000. Facilities work includes rehabilitation of both new and vacated areas, connection to the "Critical" backup power system, and provision of special air conditioning.

Signed: John F. Blake

John F. Blake
Director of Logistics

25X1 cc: C/ [] OC

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Adse
✓ 1 - OL/RECD Official
1 - OL/RECD/HEB
1 - OL/RECD Chrono
1 - D/L Chrono

25X1 C/RECD/OL []
(16 Apr 75)

Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86-01019R000100210001-1

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86-01019R000100210001-1

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

ECT: (Optional)

A:

ef, Headquarters Engineering Branch,
STAT RECD/OL

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

4 JUN 1973

(Officer designation, room number, and
ing)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALSCOMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

DC/RECD/OL

Room 906, Ames Building

Tony,

Per your request attached is a Memo for the Record concerning the consolidation of Operation Centers. The memo implies that we know what the HVAC load for the final consolidation will be where, in fact, we are using our best estimate. Specifically, the 60-ton is allocated as follows: PSD 20-ton, DCI 8-ton, special conference rooms 5-ton (this is the NIPE/CIRIS and assume they still need standby) which leaves a total of 27-ton for the new Consolidated Operations Center. Right now, we estimate Phase I requires about 8-ton, therefore, the requirements of the consolidation should be within the 27-ton available.

Dave

Dave

ILLEGIB

4 JUN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Proposed Modifications for the Seventh Floor Headquarters Operations Center

1. The Headquarters Engineering Branch was requested on 1 June 1973 to prepare a budgetary estimate for HVAC modifications necessary to support the proposed consolidation of Operations Centers within the Headquarters Building.
2. The present Operations Center is serviced from the house chilled water system. The house system in turn is backed up by the two 15-ton units which also provide backup to the seventh floor Special Printing Facility, special conference rooms, and other miscellaneous areas. This unit is 11-years old, manually activated, and does not have adequate capacity to meet the totality of the existing demand (there is approximately 60-tons of air handling capability connected to this unit and 40-ton demand against the 30-ton backup capability).
3. It is presently proposed that the new HVAC system serving the recently renovated DCI area be connected to this system, and economy and space dictate that the Consolidation Operation Center also be served from this system.
4. Accordingly, the system should be upgraded such that it has a capability to meet the totality of present and future requirements. This uprating will greatly increase the reliability through replacing aging and obsolete equipment with new equipment, and the control circuitry will be fully automatic such that we do not have to depend on limited GSA manning to activate the system during emergency situations.
5. The cost for uprating the North Penthouse system is \$92,750. This option will provide adequate capacity to meet present and projected loads. It must be noted that money has been transferred to GSA to provide a house chilled-water grid within the Building. When this grid is available, miscellaneous loads presently on this system can be reconnected to the grid system as these miscellaneous loads do not need a backup capability. With the removal of these loads, the demand of our legitimate loads (Operations Center, PSD Printing Facility, DCI's Office, and special conference rooms) will be well within the capacity of the proposed 60-ton unit.

5

25X1

Headquarters Engineering Branch, PSCE/OL

Att - Cost Estimate

SUBJECT: Proposed Modifications for the Seventh Floor Headquarters
Operations Center

Distribution:

4 JUN 1973

- 0 - OL/RECD/HEB (Proj), w/att
- ~~X~~ - OL/RECD, w/att
- 1 - OL/RECD/HEB (Chrono), w/att

OL/RECD/HEB (1 Jun 73)

STAT

4 JUN 1973


Cost Estimate
for
Up-Grading North Penthouse Air Conditioning

Based on the limited time made available to properly survey the site, the cost estimate below should not be considered firm:

Sixty ton chilled water capacity - (2 chillers with multi-compressors)	\$48,000
Agency Security and other requirements-	7,200
Contractor-OH&P-	<u>12,000</u>
Total Contract Cost-	\$67,200
Contingency-	13,440
GSA-Design and Inspection Fees-	<u>12,096</u>
Total Cost-	\$92,736

NOTE: The above cost estimate does not include an inflationary factor.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)				
Estimated Cost - Phase II - Operations Center Consolidation				
FROM:		EXTENSION		NO.
Deputy Chief, Real Estate and Construction Division, OL 906 Ames		<i>gm13</i>		DATE
				19 July 1974
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Director of Logistics 1206 Ames	19 JUL 1974	<i>Ly</i>		<p>Per your inquiry at the staff meeting yesterday, the estimated cost of facilities modifications relative to Phase II modifications to the Operations Center was \$265,000 as defined and qualified in paragraph 3 of the D/L memorandum dated 18 April 1973 (Att 1).</p> <p>If Phase II is accomplished, the special independent HVAC system in the north penthouse must also be upgraded at a cost approximating \$100,000 (Att 2 - HEB memorandum dated 4 June 1973). This cost is not included in the above \$265,000 facilities modification estimate but we intend to address its analysis and upgrading as part of the HVAC Phase II design and modification project tentatively using Phase II funding (approximately \$560,000 presently committed to GSA). Since the special independent system serves as a backup source for both the Operations Center and several other functions including the DCI and the seventh floor PSD print plant, etc., its funding for upgrading might logically be considered within the intent of general building services project funding (OL/RECD Fan 1121).</p> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;">  Tony </div>
2.				
3. <i>DD/L</i>	19 JUL 1974	<i>J</i>		
4.				
5. <i>RECD</i>				
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Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86-01019R000100210001-1

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

7 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Logistical Services Division, OL

SUBJECT : Background paper on space needs of CIA
Operations Center

1. In accordance with the several telephone conversations we have had recently on the subject of space needs, attached is a "quick" study pulled together by the staff here. What it says in summary is that we need at a very minimum 5,000 square feet to do the job we understand the Director wants to do now and in the near future. As indicated in the attached, our general needs fall under the following headings:

- A. Crisis management space. To accommodate one major and one minor task force. At present we cannot accommodate, without considerable loss of efficiency even one major task force. We are doing it now, but not at all well.
- B. Need for more functional and private space. The present state of our Watch bullpen and the DDO and DDS&T space is much below minimum standards for even a routine function which theirs certainly is not. Then there is our need for more adequate administrative space for our very sizable clerical and paper processing functions. (In spite of our enhanced stature the space available for this category and A. above is still the same it was 10 years ago.)
- C. The desire to transfer certain DDS&T Operations Centers to the CIA Center. (The OWI and SSOC Centers). The report of 13 April also discusses the desirability of transferring the DDO/TW function from the Cable Secretariat location to the Center.

- D. To accommodate the probable transfer of the function and some of the personnel of the National Indications Center (a supporting mechanism of the USIB Watch Committee) from the Pentagon to the CIA Operations Center.
- E. To enable us to be ready to go to a NIOC mode when the Director so chooses. This means the need to accommodate some 35 to 50 additional personnel from other Agencies of the Intelligence Community.

2. I hope the attached, when added to Annexes C and E of the "Report of Working Group on Operations Centers Information Flows, etc.," dated 13 April 1973 to the CIA Management Committee, will suffice to enable you and Messrs Van Dam and Brownman to adequately represent the views of the Center in what ever discussions are necessary. Overall, I am convinced that we need the [] square feet indicated and that the present SAVA space, configured and vaulted as it is, would be ideal for our needs. It seems to me that the costs of having to vault other space would more than offset any cost of constructing a connecting staircase between the present location and the SAVA space on the sixth floor.

STAT

[]

Chief, CIA Operations Center

STAT

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Deputy Chief, Real Estate and Construction Division, OL

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

28 November 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Director of Logistics
1206 Ames Bldg.

28 NOV 1973

Per your request at our Monday afternoon meeting with LSD concerning Phase II NIOC, attached are copies of pertinent papers from our files indicating documentation of key actions and summaries to date and the original DCI authorization paper creating the in-house study committee whose members represent all Directorates. [redacted] represents DD/MGS and I provide support to him.

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EVELYN

6.

PLEASE KEEP THIS PORTION OF THE FILE IN TACT FOR IMMEDIATE FURTHER USE BY

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8.

D/L. FILE WITH PARENT FILE IN THIS FORM.

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10/11/29

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12.

D/L :

15 JUL 1974

13.

PER OUR DISCUSSION THIS MORNING

14.

THE ATTACHED IS A GOOD BROAD BRUSH

15.

ON THE OPERATION CENTER (CONFIDENTIAL) Tony 11/15/74

15 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Logistics Services Division, OL

SUBJECT : Proposed Modifications to the Seventh Floor Headquarters Operations Center

1. Per our telephone conversation on 2 May 1973, this memorandum will confirm our coordination concerning Office of Logistics (OL) actions relative to the proposed consolidation of operations centers in the Headquarters Building and, more specifically, the present request by the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) to start formal planning of space modifications and construction within present limits of the operations center to accommodate Phase I of the above program.

2. As we discussed, I have been assigned the task of OL focal point officer on this proposed project. Along with Mr. [] Chief, [] Office of Communications, I am a member of a committee whose members represent all directorates and will provide input and coordination regarding the proposed consolidation. I am essentially providing support to Mr. [] who is reporting directly to the Associate Deputy Director for Management and Services.


3. Upon discussing this recent request from OCI with Mr. [] it was felt that it would be beneficial to start formal planning, as requested, while awaiting a decision on the consolidation proposal from the CIA Management Committee. Mr. [] also expressed the opinion that the proposed modifications to the existing operations center might be desired even if the consolidation proposal were disapproved.

4. In view of these considerations, and as you and I agreed, it would be beneficial and constructive to pursue formal planning of the proposed Phase I modifications as you can work it into your extensive planning schedule. The Chief, Headquarters Engineering Branch, has been informed of this project and is awaiting communication from the Architectural Design Staff in order to provide appropriate coordination and technical input.

OL 3 2822

SUBJECT: Proposed Modifications to the Seventh Floor Headquarters
Operations Center

5. In order to ensure total OL coordination and feedback between the Real Estate and Construction Division (RECD) and the Logistics Services Division (LSD) on any aspect of this proposed consolidation of operations centers, it is recommended that all major policy communications, status reports, and actions continue to be communicated and coordinated between the Deputy Chief, RECD, and the Chief, LSD.



STAT

Deputy Chief

Real Estate and Construction Division, OL

cc: C. [redacted] OC

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 Adse.
1 - OL/RECD Official
1 - OL/RECD Chrono
1 - OL/RECD/HEB
1 - OL Reader

OL/RECD: [redacted]
(15 May 1973)

filed 5/4/73

1260/5

Analysis of Draft Ops Center Report

1. Apparent Discrepancies: Analysis of attached with respect to Office of Logistics impact is made substantially more difficult by three factors:

a. Annex B (an inventory of "centers" and their interrelationship) and Annex C (an initial estimate of resource requirements for an expanded Ops Center) are not included in the package.

b. Multiple terms and acronyms are used to describe the various centers with resultant lack of clarity as to which centers have been analyzed. I strongly suspect some may have been overlooked and cannot, to my satisfaction, completely resolve the count in paragraph 5 on page 3 of nine centers, three standby centers, and three computer centers (ORD is obviously overlooked and NPIC's computer and signal centers are apparently treated as an entity). The following appears to be the count:

Centers

IW	Intelligence Watch
FMSAC	First Floor Analysis Room
SSOC	OEL's [] Center on First Floor
SIGNAL CENTER	OC on First Floor
CABLE SEC	First Floor
DATA COM	[] on Sixth Floor
NPIC	Combined Signal Center and Computer Center []
FBIS	Signal Center in Key Building
NSO	Night Security Officer

Standby Centers

JOIC	[] Center
OSA	Ops Center at [] Building

Third center is not identified. SAVA is mentioned as phasing out. The [] Ops Center is presumed to be included with SAVA. VASRAC is mentioned but acronym is not understood; possibly equates to SAVA.

Computer Centers

Only OCS is identified; however, it is assumed that CRS and ISD were the other two centers intended. OEL/AND (with control of the Hybrid Computer formerly at [] and ORD computer centers are STAT not mentioned.

c. Impact on the seventh floor printing plant is not discussed (nor, I suspect, considered).

2. Report Recommendations: Recommendations as summarized below are divided into three "phases." Phases I and II overlap with the only apparent difference being National Security Council approval of an Intelligence Community center at Headquarters (NIOC or National Intell Ops Center). Phase III is completely STAT "blue sky" and dependent on the scope of a Headquarters terminal for the [] project (also called PF and [] and development of CDS (apparently a "Central" or "Consolidated Dissemination System" being developed by OC).

a. Phase I

- 1) Add DD/M&S and DD/S&T Duty Officers to Ops Center.
- 2) Transfer traffic "scanning" and "selection" functions to Ops Center Duty Officers (with prior elimination of the receiving Signal Centers of low precedence and administrative traffic).
- 3) Expansion of 3,000 square feet. STAT

[]

b. Phase II

- 1) Provide space and commo for crisis task forces.
- 2) Provide space for State, DIA, and NSA duty officers.
- 3) Provide space for IW.

4) Note that the 3,000 square feet of Phase I is supposed to be adequate for these additional functions.

c. Phase III

Design of a "modern Ops Center" by FY 1976. The question of inclusion of FMSAC and SSOC is raised. It is recognized elsewhere in the text that CDS [] terminal configurations are critical.

3. Facilities Impact:

a. Phases I and II:

1) An estimated [] is required.

2) There is no basis to verify square footage requirements; a furniture/equipment layout is essential.

3) There is no basis for estimates of power and A/C requirements except that in all probability additional commo lines will be required (for State traffic and to upgrade the White House line); therefore, additional A/C and Frantic power will be necessary.

4) If space is chosen on the sixth floor (mentioned as a possibility), "Project [] is requested.

5) Extensions of data grids will probably be required to provide all-source message input.

6) The seventh floor printing plant should be analyzed against new Ops Center requirements to determine adequacy of existing facilities.

b. Phase III:

Report recommendations are too tenuous to base firm facilities requirements on; nevertheless, certain conclusions are apparent:

a) A mini-computer room with backup A/C and power elevated floors et al will be required.

b) It will be virtually impossible to convert the existing Ops Center to this configuration without interruption of on-going activities.

4. Facilities Considerations, Phase III:

a. Other than access to the seventh floor printing plant, there seems to be no compelling reason to have the Ops Center on the seventh floor.

b. Many of the criteria applicable to centralized computer space (or "gutting thesis") would seem to apply to a next generation Ops Center (i.e., computer room environment, proximity to backup utilities, proximity to the Signal Center/Cable Sec., expansion space, difficulty of maintaining operations during construction, centralization of currently separated functions).

5. Recommendation:

STAT The Office of Logistics should assign a permanent representative to provide facilities input for both phases of planning. In consideration, [] is better suited than [] knows each of the Ops Centers intimately (he STAT designed them), is knowledgeable of all the Headquarters utilities systems, fully conversant with the "gutting thesis" and other active Headquarters projects, and has a far superior understanding of ADS and relocation procedures.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 APR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Cost Estimate for Facilities Modifications
Related to Study Group Recommendations
on a Consolidated Operations Center,
Headquarters Building

1. This memorandum is for your information only, as requested by the Assistant Deputy Director for Management and Services.

2. The subject study group recommendations contemplate three phases of activity. These phases are related to facilities changes as follows:

a. Phase I: No additional space required. Existing LOX equipment and some offices would be relocated within the existing area.

b. Phase II: Sixth floor space now occupied by VASRAC would accrue to the Operations Center. Additional space, as required up to a total of [REDACTED], would be assigned from DD/I space on the seventh floor, F Corridor. The Special Systems Operations Center, OEL, and FMSAC centers on the first floor would be relocated to the existing VASRAC area.

c. Phase III: This "ultimate" Operations Center configuration is insufficiently defined to permit relation to facilities requirements.

3. Cost estimates for facilities modifications for Phases I and II above, have been prepared; Phase III cannot be estimated because of lack of definition of the scope of work.

a. Phase I facilities work is estimated at \$35,000 (this estimate is included in the subject report). Work includes partition changes and rehabilitation of the existing air-conditioning system.

OL 3 2261

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Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86-01019R000100210001-1

SUBJECT: Cost Estimate for Facilities Modifications Related to
Study Group Recommendations on a Consolidated Operations
Center, Headquarters Building

b. Phase II facilities work is estimated at \$265,000, plus an additional \$55,000 if an internal staircase is required as stated in the report. Total facilities cost then becomes \$320,000, plus an estimate of \$50,000 to \$80,000 for communications installation and connection (prepared by the Office of Communications) with a resultant total estimated cost of \$400,000. Facilities work includes rehabilitation of both new and vacated areas, connection to the "Critical" backup power system, and provision of special air conditioning.

Signed: John F. Blake

John F. Blake
Director of Logistics

25X1

cc: OC

Distribution:

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1 - OL/RECD Chrono
1 - D/L Chrono

25X1

C/RECD/OL:
(16 Apr 73)

Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86-01019R000100210001-1

CONFIDENTIAL

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL SECRET		
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Director of Logistics	23 APR 1973	SI
2	AC/RECD/OL	4/24	
3	DC/RECD	4/27	AFB
4			
5			
6	C/RECD	4/30	S
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: <p>Jack,</p> <p>Larry's note explains the variation in budget estimates which I passed to you previously. We would like to retain a copy in RECD because of Tony's participation in this exercise. If you wish to retain attached, please have Polly advise us and we will come up and burn a copy for our files.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Thank you,</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Glenn 4/17/73</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
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FORM NO. 1-67 237

Use previous editions

(40)

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Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86-01019R000100210001-1

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

REPORT OF STUDY GROUP ON OPERATIONS CENTER

FROM:

DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS
2 D 00 HQS.

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

13 APRIL 1973

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1 CHIEF, REAL ESTATE &
CONSTRUCTION DIV., OL
1227 AMES BLD.

2.

3. DIRECTOR OF
LOGISTICS
1227 AMES BLD.

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1. Attached is a copy of the final report our study group produced for the CIA Management Committee.

2. The following points should be noted:

A. Initially, the DD/M&S will not place a Duty Officer in the Operations Center, but has the option to do so in times of crisis or at some later date if it appears that such action is warranted.

B. DD/M&S activities will be "monitored" by the Operations Center during out-of-duty hours. The Management Committee has been asked to specify the degree of control they want the Operations Center to exercise over CIA activities.

C. The \$60,000 cost in Phase I is for upgrading the air-conditioning and for renovations in the present Operations Center, plus costs for communications equipment changes.

D. In Phase II the \$150,000 - \$200,000 figure is for renovating the SAVA area on the 6th floor and for connecting the 6th and 7th floors with an internal stairway. The \$125,000 for a data link is a figure supplied by NSA. The \$350,000 is for construction and communications costs for moving FMSAC and SSOC into the

OL 3.2266

Member, Study Group

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EDITIONS

Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP86-01019R000100210001-1

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UNCLASSIFIED

13 APR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: FMSAC & OEL Transition Cost Estimate

1. On 11 April 1973, an estimate was prepared concerning the graduation of FMSAC and OEL to the sixth floor. The proposed location has been specified as the F corridor.

2. This estimate is itemized as follows:

		REC'D
Mechanical	57,000	1 C 9 4/16
Electrical	50,000	2 DC
Raised Floor	14,000	EX
Raise Ceiling	10,000	SA
Area Renovation	50,000	C/REB
Office Space	12,000	RO
Refurbish Existing Areas	30,000	3 C/FENG B 4/16
		PE
		C/HEB
		PE
		FILE
	223,000	
A & B + Contingencies	45,000	
Total Estimate	268,000	

/S/

 Project Engineer

Distribution:

- 0 - OL/RECD/HEB (Project)
- X - OL/RECD
- 1 - OL/RECD/HEB (Chrono)

 OL/RECD/HEB (13 April 73)

STAT

STAT

7 March 1973

ANNEX A

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT : Management Committee Study Group on Watch,
Indication and Warning Procedures

1. The following officers are appointed to a Study Group:

DD/I : Richard Lehman (Chairman)

DD/O :

DD/S&T: Sayre Stevens

DD/S :

STAT

STAT

2. The Study Group will review the structure and function of all Agency 24-hour "watch" operations and situation rooms and make recommendations for their consolidation and rationalization. It will study the activity of these centers in initial handling of incoming information of all degrees of sensitivity from all sources, with a view to improving the processes of alerting, selection, and assignment of action. Finally, it will examine the role of these centers, and related activities in the field and at Headquarters, in the receipt, processing, and dissemination of raw intelligence acquired by the Agency from all sources.


3. On the basis of these findings, the Study Group will recommend any changes it believes necessary in the existing proposal for a National Intelligence Operations Center. Its recommendations with regard to Agency activities should not be dependent, however, on the establishment of an NIOC.

4. In general, the Study Group should work toward maximum simplification and centralization of Agency operations by the integration

MCA-11

of related activities of the individual Directorates. In so doing, it should seek a reasonable balance among the conflicting objectives of effectiveness, security, and economy.

5. The Study Group's report will be submitted by 15 April 1973.



W. E. Colby
Executive Secretary
CIA Management Committee

STAT

Annex D

This annex deals with 24-hour centers and standby facilities other than the Operations Center. The language is subject to modification in the light of Management Council decisions on the degree of their subordination to the Operations Center.

A. Office of the Director

1. VASRAC. To be discontinued as soon as conditions in Vietnam permit, and its remaining functions returned to the Operations Center.

B. DDI

1. FBIS. The FBIS wire room is located in [] and must be physically adjacent [] of FBIS. It should remain where it is, and be under the guidance of the DDI senior duty officer.
2. [] should await decision whether [] is to be transferred to the DDO. In any case, [] traffic should be scanned by the DDI Duty Officer at all times.

3. NPIC/IAS. To be under guidance of the DDI/DO. All cable traffic not already routed to the Operations Center by OSP or NPIC should be so routed.

C. DDO

1. DDO/DO. The existing DDO/DO should be continued. He should be sufficiently senior and be provided with adequate guidelines to enable him to speak for the DDO in non-duty hours with only a minimum recourse outside for decisions in exceptional cases. He should receive all the sensitive traffic now handled by the Cable Duty Officer, and the alerting and "call-in" function should be handled by him or by the other Directorate duty officers as appropriate.
2. Intelligence Watch. The Intelligence Watch should operate under the substantive guidance of the DDO duty officer. It should be physically located in the Operations Center in order to take advantage of the information

available there.

- 25X1 3. ☐ The standby ☐ facility should 25X1
become part of the Operations Center
general facilities for crisis management.

D. DDS&T

1. A DDS&T duty officer and necessary supporting staff should be installed in the Operations Center. He should have the same relationship to his deputy director and to the activities of his Directorate as those of the DDI and DDO duty officers.
2. OSP. The OSP Signal Center is in process of consolidation with the main Signal Center. Its alerting function should be transferred to the DDS&T Duty Officer.
3. FMSAC. The FMSAC Center should be monitored out of hours by the DDS&T Duty Officer. Consideration should be given to the possibility of moving this center and the adjacent OEL facilities into the Operations Center.
4. OEL. SSOC should be handled in a similar fashion to FMSAC.
5. OSA. The present standby OSA Control Center in the ☐ Building should remain where it is,

although the DDS&T Duty Officer should see its traffic. It is a reasonable assumption that this program will not survive much longer in any case.

E. DDM&S

1. DDM&S/DO. The DDM&S should establish a duty officer in the Operations Center parallel to those of the other Directorates.
2. OC. The Signal Center and its related dissemination facilities should be monitored by the DDM&S Duty Officer out of duty hours. There is clearly no requirement for, and a great deal of inefficiency in, physically consolidating the Operations Center and the CIA Communications facilities.
3. OS. The Night Security Officer is a specialized function properly located on the first floor. The NSO, however, should be monitored by the DDM&S Duty Officer.
4. OL. The DDM&S Duty Officer should maintain cognizance over the out of hours motor pool,

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courier, printing, telephone, etc., activities
of OL.

5. OCS. The consolidated computer centers of
OCS will operate under the cognizance of the
DDM&S Duty Officer.

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8 January 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT : Proposed Establishment of a National
Intelligence Operations Center (NIOC)

1. The NIOC Committee set up by the Executive Director-Comptroller has examined the proposal to establish a National Intelligence Operations Center. We believe that the proposal is timely and that the establishment of an NIOC is both feasible and increasingly necessary. We have agreed on a prospectus for such a center. (Attachment 1)

2. We believe that the DDI should be the executive agent for the management of an NIOC. We have also examined manning, budgetary and physical requirements, and these are set forth in Attachment 2. While it is not possible to provide definitive cost estimates at this stage, we are satisfied that the costs we can foresee would not be excessive in terms of Agency resources.

3. If you approve our findings, we recommend you open discussions with the NSC Staff and OMB, with a view to obtaining a directive from NSC to establish an NIOC. We are prepared to furnish you the necessary talking papers.

[Redacted Signature]

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PAUL V. WALSH
Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chairman, NIOC Committee

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Attachments: a/s

[Redacted Content]

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Attachment 1

A National Intelligence Operations Center

1. Twenty-odd years ago the CIA Operations Center consisted of a graduate student sleeping by a telephone at night. Twelve years ago the White House had no 24-hour watch apparatus except its communications center, and the Department of Defense had no central command center at all. Today there exists an intricate network of round-the-clock operations and intelligence centers, linked by secure communications, and among them controlling virtually all the essential national security activities of the Federal Government.

2. Despite the progress that has been made, the solution has never quite caught up with the problem. No rationale other than individual agency interests has ever been applied to operations center development. The true lines of authority and responsibility within the National Security Council structure have never been reflected in organization. New developments in collection and communications have overtaken present operating concepts. In recent months, a number of these matters have reached a stage at which another quantum jump forward in Community organization appears feasible and desirable.

A. Factors Bearing on Such a Reorganization:

3. The authority of the DCI has been substantially strengthened. As a member of the various NSC Committees--SRG, WSAG, 40, NSCIC, DPRC, Verification Panel, VSSG--his position, first defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as the President's intelligence officer and the spokesman of the Intelligence Community to the political authorities has been further institutionalized. In particular, through the WSAG he carries the national intelligence responsibility in crisis management. Equally important, his position was reinforced by the President's reorganization of November 1971. He has instructions to organize the Community more efficiently and to save money. These changes have not so far been reflected in Community organization for crisis management.

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4. Existing and programmed SIGINT and photographic collection systems provide powerful new capabilities for warning and crisis intelligence and, in general, enhance the flow of timely data into the current intelligence process. No central facility exists, however, whereby these new capabilities, in conjunction with conventional sources, may be used to full advantage in response to national intelligence requirements, particularly those which emerge in rapidly moving situations.

5. NSCID #3 is permissive in its wording on the production of national current intelligence. There is no clearly defined responsibility, a lack especially felt under conditions of crisis. The result is an uncontrolled, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory outpouring of raw information as well as current intelligence to the national authorities, a problem under study by the NSCIC Working Group.

6. Technical collection-analysis-dissemination systems have been developed which provide tactical warning that a strategic attack against the US is under way. The problem of longer range ("strategic") warning is much more difficult since it involves judgments on enemy intent in the absence of clear-cut, unambiguous actions; technical systems are unlikely to resolve the problem. Strategic warning can only be the product of a continuing and comprehensive analysis of all relevant information. The national military authorities, however, have defined their needs for strategic warning in terms parallel to those for tactical; they require a degree of timeliness and specificity which the Intelligence Community is unable to provide. The National Indications Center, originally conceived for this purpose, is growing obsolete and is increasingly isolated. It should be replaced with a system more responsive to present military needs.

7. The ASD(I) is preparing to put forward a proposal to solve some of these problems. He would concentrate all crisis management activities in the NMCC/NMIC, in support of the "National Command Authorities", defined as the President and the Secretary of Defense. While we agree that there are problems that need solving, and that a great deal of simplification and centralization within the DOD is desirable, we find this specific solution unacceptable.

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a. It confuses the national military command line (President-Secretary of Defense-JCS-NMCC) with the national intelligence support channel (DCI-NSC-President), and in so doing ignores the role of the Secretary of State. The intelligence judgment is put in the hands of the military authorities who must act on it.

b. It narrows the focus of crisis management to the ultimate military threat. The problem of crisis management is really much broader, and involves equally important economic and political considerations.

c. It relies on machine and organizational solutions to the strategic warning problem, and gives no attention--or even access--to the broad analytic base on which strategic warning judgment depends. In so doing, it down plays the political and economic factors essential to a judgment on strategic warning.

d. It does not reflect the actual authority and responsibility of the DCI, and in particular his responsibilities to the national authorities in all varieties of crisis, political, economic, and military.

B. A Conceptual Framework:

8. In the national security field, operational or command channels run from the President to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and from them to their deputies or to the State Operations Center and (through the JCS) to the NMCC. The State Operations Center and the NMCC are supported departmentally by INR and the NMIC. Although the DCI does not stand in the command line for any major matters, he nonetheless has national responsibilities for intelligence support to the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the NSC Staff mechanism. National intelligence channels run from the DCI to the President.

9. The DCI must thus supply current intelligence support to the national authorities. This comes in three phases:

a. Under normal conditions, the DCI represents the Intelligence Community in the NSC and its subordinate

bodies: SRG, Verification Panel, etc. He must provide daily reporting on current events and their significance, fuller analysis as required, a systematic and continuous examination of the strategic warning problem, and a 24-hour alert system. The first of these requirements he meets through the Central Intelligence Bulletin, a national publication in all but name. The second he meets through National Intelligence Estimates, fully coordinated, and CIA Memoranda, unilateral. The weekly Watch Report, coordinated and national, is an effort to meet the strategic warning requirement, but one which is effective only when there is no warning to give. An ad hoc 24-hour alert system exists, but no center has clearly defined national intelligence responsibilities.

b. Under crisis conditions, whether the primary threat be political, economic, or military, the DCI represents the Community in the WSAG. In addition to his normal responsibilities, he must supply the national authorities with periodic situation reports. At present, he does this unilaterally, as do other USIB agencies. There is no mechanism for national situation reports.

c. Under the threat of general war (a particular kind of crisis), the DCI must supplement his situation reports with a continuously reviewed judgment on enemy strategic intentions, both for the national authorities and for the military authorities responsible for interpreting tactical warning. The present Watch Committee/NIC structure is supposed to provide such a judgment, but is less and less capable of doing so.

C. Proposed Reorganization:

10. There is clearly a need for an organizational structure which will permit the DCI to carry out all these responsibilities to the national authorities in a coherent way and on a national basis. He therefore proposes to establish a National Intelligence Operations Center in the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. The NIOC will be organized as follows:

a. Mission

i. To provide 24-hour national current intelligence support to the President, the National Security Council, the heads of departments and agencies involved in national security affairs, and their supporting staffs. (Hereafter referred to as the National Security Authorities.)

ii. To support the Director of Central Intelligence in such others of his responsibilities as he may from time to time designate.

b. Functions

i. To scan, on a 24-hour, 7-day basis, all incoming information available to the United States Government on activities of foreign governments.

ii. To alert the National Security Authorities, through appropriate channels, to the receipt of significant intelligence.

iii. To produce all-source national current intelligence periodicals; coordinated among the USIB agencies to the extent possible, for dissemination to the National Security Authorities.

iv. To carry on a continuing analysis of incoming intelligence for indications that a foreign power intends to engage in aggressive military action against the United States or its interests; to provide through USIB and its Watch Committee a status report, at least weekly, on this analysis; to conduct research to improve techniques in indications analysis.

v. To establish and administer a system of "national intelligence alerts".

vi. When a crisis--be it political, economic or military--occurs or is threatened, to establish an inter-agency task force in the NIOC to provide intelligence support to the National Security Authorities.

These task forces will produce, or as appropriate task others to produce, national intelligence situation reports and such other intelligence as is requested by these authorities. When requests are of a character that would call for estimative treatment, as in a Special National Intelligence Estimate, task forces will consult the DCI's Office of National Estimates and the latter will initiate a SNIE according to its customary procedures.

vii. When a crisis occurs which threatens to involve the United States in hostilities with a foreign power, to provide the National Security Authorities and the NMCC/NMIC with a continuous analysis of, and judgment on, enemy intentions with respect to military action, under the guidance to the extent possible of the USIB Watch Committee.

viii. In support of these objectives, to provide a centralized facility to act as the focal point for the issuance of timely current intelligence requirements to all major collection systems in rapidly moving situations. In crisis situations NIOC requirements will be given precedence by collection system managers as necessary to meet the immediate requirements of the national security authorities.

ix. To be informed of US diplomatic and military activities in order to improve understanding of the actions and reactions of foreign governments and to achieve optimum timeliness and relevance of intelligence support.

x. To maintain such briefing facilities as may be required.

c. Relationships

i. The National Intelligence Operations Center is a national facility established by the DCI, with the advice and assistance of USIB, under the provisions of NSCID's #1 and #3.

ii. The chain of command is from the President to the appropriate committee of the NSC to the DCI to the Director, NIOC.

iii. The NIOC's primary responsibility is to the President and NSC Staff. It will normally be responsive,

however, to requirements of the State Operations Center and the NMCC/NMIC, and in certain circumstances (see para b, section vii above) has specified responsibilities to the NMCC/NMIC.

iv. The Director, NIOC will be designated by the DCI. His deputy will be designated by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the DCI. The NIOC will be jointly manned by CIA, DIA, INR, and NSA, and each agency will maintain a senior representative accredited thereto. Any task forces that may be formed will be jointly manned by CIA, DIA and INR analysts assigned to augment NIOC for this purpose, under the direction of an officer designated by the DCI.

v. The NIOC will establish 24-hour liaison with the White House Situation Room, the State Operations Center, the NMCC/NMIC, and the National SIGINT Operations Center. At least in the case of the NMCC/NMIC this liaison will be maintained by an interagency team (CIA, DIA, INR, NSA) on duty in the NMCC.

vi. All major collection categories will be represented on a 24-hour basis in the NIOC.

vii. The Directorates of Intelligence and Science and Technology, CIA, will furnish first-line analytic support to the NIOC.

viii. CIA will supply the facilities, communications, funding, and other logistic support of the NIOC as a service of common concern.

d. Organization

i. NIOC will be headed by a Director and Deputy Director, as stated above. It will consist of six groups: Watch, Collection, Liaison, Indications, Production, and Support, plus the senior CIA, DIA, NSA and INR representatives. The CIA representative will handle CIA's departmental operations center responsibilities. (At least

initially, some NIOC personnel will serve concurrently in more than one position.)

ii. The watch group will consist of sufficient watch teams to man the center on a 24-hour basis. Each team will consist of CIA, INR and DIA duty officers, with the CIA officer in charge, and a number of watch officers furnished by CIA.

25X1 iii. The collection group will consist of sufficient teams to provide 24-hour representation for NSA, COMIREX, CIA (Clandestine Service, [] FBIS and DD/S&T), State, and DIA. Representatives for other collection systems will be added as required. The State, DIA and certain CIA positions will normally be filled by the corresponding watch team members.

iv. The liaison group will consist of CIA officers on duty at the White House Situation Room and State Operations Center (if a requirement for these jobs is established), and round-the-clock USIB teams in the NMCC/NMIC. These teams will consist of CIA, DIA, NSA and State members. The CIA member will be in charge, and will be under control of the senior duty officer in the NIOC. Team members may also serve as departmental representatives of their agencies in the NMCC.

v. The indications group will have two elements, a USIB Watch Committee Secretariat and a research element, manned jointly by CIA, DIA, and NSA. (State participation will be invited.) The Secretariat will draft the weekly Watch Report.

vi. The production group, furnished by CIA, will consist of sufficient editorial, graphics, and publications personnel to meet NIOC's requirements. ✓

vii. The support group, furnished by CIA, will supply administrative, data-processing, communications, and logistic support as required. ✓

e. Organizational Changes

i. The National Indications Center will be abolished and its functions and CIA personnel transferred to the NIOC. (The USIB Watch Committee, however, will continue to function; NIOC will furnish its secretariat.)

ii. The NIOC will absorb the present CIA Operations Center, and most of its functions, facilities, and personnel. The exceptions will be those functions which must remain internal to CIA.

iii. The CIA chief of the NIOC representation in the NMCC will also serve as the DCI's representative to the Secretary of Defense.

iv. The Watch Committee Secretariat will absorb the scanning functions of the CIA Indications Officer.

v. The Central Intelligence Bulletin will become the National Intelligence Bulletin. ✓

vi. The USIB agency representatives in the NIOC will serve as the coordination panel for the NIB, under the guidance of the NIB chairman.

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Attachment 2

CIA Considerations for an NIOC

1. By definition, a National Intelligence Operations Center must answer to the DCI. Much of its activity will be in close support of the DCI and some of its instructions will come from him. Provision must also be made for a number of other unilateral CIA activities within the center. Among others, these include operations of the Clandestine Service, DDI production, and CIA representation on the Watch Committee. Furthermore, the NIOC must retain the present integration of the CIA Operations Center with its analytic base. The center must be a service organization with its analytic capability provided by the production offices of the DDI and DD/S&T. This capability must, however, be available to the center around the clock and on short notice, and must underpin all center activities (and vice versa). These considerations argue strongly that the existing command relationships remain unchanged--i.e., that the DDI be the executive agent for the NIOC on much the same basis he is for the present Operations Center.


2. The following pages describe the resources that would be required for an NIOC. They include charts showing NIOC organization, a typical manning shift, and estimated manpower, space and equipment requirements.

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
NIOC ORGANIZATION



*positions
round-the-clock manning
requires 5 officers for
each position except WHSR
where 9 officers staff two
positions

**position covered
by Sr. Duty Officers

WATCH TEAM



* CIA SDO is responsible for DCI special interests as well as for FBIS collection guidance.

As indicated by asterisks, CIA, State, and DIA Duty officers have certain collection responsibilities as well.

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CONSTRUCTION

a. Circular stairway to provide internal passage between 7th and 6th floor F corridor south -----\$45,000

b. Internal 6th and 7th floor space realignment ----- ?

c. Additional furnishings for Situation Room ----- 5,000

EQUIPMENT (not already present in CIA Operations Center)

a. OPSCOM console circuit with NSA NSOC Ft. Meade ----- ?

b. OPSCOM Teletype circuit with NSA NSOC Ft. Meade and drop to OSR -----\$13,632

c. *TV link to PORTAL processing facility

d. Other one-time cost projections:

Feasibility/cost studies to be undertaken on:

- USIB community secure TV system
- ADP supported scanning system using CRTs to eliminate insofar as possible paper processing.
- Query terminal to CRS ADP files systems as they develop using printers and visual display techniques.

*being staffed separately

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 16 JUL 1974
TO: OL/RECD <i>DC/RECD</i>		
ROOM NO. 906	BUILDING Ames	
REMARKS: THANKX, Mike		
FROM: Director of Logistics		
ROOM NO. 1206	BUILDING Ames	

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FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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6 April 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Management Council

SUBJECT : Report of Working Group on Operations
Centers, Information Flows, etc.

1. Attached herewith is the Working Group report. A second report will deal with the reports function.

2. We recommend the transformation of the present Operations Center into a true Operations Center, using the full data-processing facilities of the Agency as they develop. Our specific recommendations are in Paragraphs 18-21. If accepted, they will provide a single, central point for:

- Scanning of electrical narrative traffic arriving in Headquarters from all sources for items of immediate concern.
- Alerting of senior Agency officials, action officers, and external consumers.
- Selection of important traffic for senior Agency officers.
- Response to queries from other government agencies when no established channel exists.

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5. We recognize the bind on space. Recommendation 18j can only be carried out by displacing SAVA, although as a temporary quick fix some OCI staff space across the corridor from the present Center could be cleared.

6. The Report has four annexes.

--Annex A is our charter from the Management Council.

--Annex B is the notebook containing an inventory of Agency centers and their interrelations.

--Annex C is an initial estimate of resource requirements.

--Annex D contains specific recommendations for disposition of the Agency's secondary 24-hour centers.

Richard Lehman
Chairman

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6 April 1973

Report of Study Group on Operations Centers

1. The Study Group was charged with examining Agency 24-hour activities and related message flows with a view to consolidation and rationalization. (See Annex A) Our recommendations are contained in this report. A separate report will deal with the role of the "reports" function in handling Agency-collected raw intelligence.

2. We took as our objective the creation of a 24-hour system which would provide a single, central point for:

--Scanning of electrical narrative traffic arriving in Headquarters from all sources for items of immediate concern.

--Alerting of senior Agency officials, action officers, and external consumers.

(This function, of course, is usually carried out through command channels during duty hours.)

--Selection of important traffic for senior Agency officers.

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- Response to queries from other government agencies when no established channel exists.
- Crisis management and task force activities.
- Monitoring of all Agency activities in non-duty hours.

Present Arrangements

3. By this yardstick, the present situation is not too bad. The Agency has a number of more or less autonomous duty officers and other activities, but cooperation among them is good. The present Operations Center: scans most incoming traffic; alerts some Agency officers and most external consumers; selects some important traffic, is the point of reference for other agencies; houses DDI crisis activities, but not those of the other Directorates; monitors most Agency 24-hour activities but controls none. More important, however, is the fact that all these activities take place within the traditional framework of the Agency; the individual baronies preserve their frontiers.

4. The Operations Center is the most comprehensive and most nearly "central" of the Agency's 24-hour activities. The DDI is executive agent for

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the Operations Center. DDI and DDO have duty officers there, each of whom answers to his Deputy. The DDI officer as the senior represents the DCI to a limited, but undefined, degree. Each is generally cognizant of most out-of-hours activities of his Directorate. The DDI officer in addition controls some housekeeping functions of the DDM&S.

5. In addition to the Operations Center, there are nine other centers, three stand-by centers, and three computer centers, as well as housekeeping functions. Four of these (IW, FBIS, FMSAC, SSOC) are highly specialized processing facilities that make their results available to the Operations Center. Two (OSP* and NPIC* Signal Centers) are independent duty facilities. NSO is a support function that cooperates with the Center. The OC headquarters complex, the Signal Centers and Cable Secretariat, receives and routes traffic to all the others except NSO. Several of these centers are located with their parent component away from the Headquarters Building. (An inventory of centers is included as Annex B.)

*Manned by OC

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6. There is no obvious duplication of functions, although several centers may deal with the same traffic. There is, however, a division of the scanning, alerting, and selection functions among several centers.

--Scanning is done: in the Operations Center and FMSAC by broadly qualified substantive officers, aware of current activities on an all-source basis; in Cable Secretariat, IW and FBIS by substantive officers with limited access to other information; and in the other centers by technicians working by SOP.

--The Operations Center selects from NSA and press traffic; Cable Secretariat from CIA, State and DOD traffic; the various DDS&T offices and NPIC from "project" traffic.

--Alerting: of the DDO is divided among the DDO/DO in the Operations Center, IW, and the OC Complex; of the DDI between Operations Center and NPIC; of the DDS&T among OC (for several offices), FMSAC, and SSOC; of the DDM&S among the Operations Center, NSO, and OC Complex.

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At no one point is there full knowledge of what is going on, and there is ample room for matters to fall between two stools.

7. Some of the anomalies noted above are historical carry-overs. Others are the results of compartmentation. Compartmentation is necessary for some of the operational traffic of the DDO and DDS&T. Protection must be given to sensitive intelligence collected by other agencies. There must be privacy for the personal concerns of the DCI and DDCI, and for the medical and security activities of the DDM&S. To meet these requirements, there has grown up a maze of improvised special procedures for particular categories of sensitive traffic. No two are alike and no one element is aware of them all. Such a system maintains security, but at a considerable cost to efficiency. Eight years experience with the co-location and cooperation of the DDI and DDO Duty Officers, however, demonstrates that an Operations Center can do its job while maintaining compartmentation. But the more cable traffic is shared, the less chance of error.

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8. Another weakness of the present system has been surmounted in the past largely by good will. This is the lack of clearly defined relationships among the centers. During duty hours the Agency has an established chain of command, but when senior officers are not on board its various parts operate with relative autonomy. The Operations Center is first among equals, but its relations with the others are largely consultative. The DDI and DDO duty officers speak (within certain limits) for their Deputies at night. No one speaks for the DCI or for the other Deputies.

New Considerations

9. The DCI has stated his desire to integrate the activities of the Agency and to eliminate barriers between Directorates. Present arrangements do not serve his purposes.

10. The DCI has ordered a much more intensive effort in support of the NSC Staff and the White House Situation Room. To achieve this, the OCI PDB Staff, located in the Operations Center, has been expanded and redesignated White House Support Staff. Its activities are hampered, however, because the

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
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Operations Center as now constituted cannot provide the full information flow it requires. Moreover, present Agency methods for transmission to the White House are not fully compatible with the WHSR data-handling system.

11. The Agency is developing a consolidated, computer-based system for dissemination of narrative electrical traffic within Headquarters.



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13. The NMCC/NMIC and State Operations Centers are in process of modernization. To stay in the game, CIA must modernize too.

14. The Agency has developed, and is preparing to put forward for National Security Council approval, a proposal for a National Intelligence Operations

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Center. The primary purpose of NIOC is to pull together Community current intelligence support for the national authorities.

Conclusions

15. We believe the Agency needs a true centralized Operations Center. We believe it is feasible to modify the present system immediately to bring this about in a somewhat jury-rigged fashion. Finally, we believe that over the next 2-3 years the center can and should be transformed into a modern computer-based facility.

16. Taking the initial steps can be done cheaply, with a modest increase in personnel. The subsequent ones, however, will take money and space. Much of the costs would have been incurred in any case, however, because what we propose is largely to move existing functions rather than to create new ones. (A preliminary estimate of initial resource requirements is included as Annex C.)

17. We have re-examined the NIOC prospectus in the light of what we propose below. The two appear compatible. Some changes in detail will be necessary for NIOC, and the need for compartmentation of Agency internal activities should be reaffirmed.

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Recommendations

18. We recommend that the following steps be taken in the first 90 days after approval of this report.

- a. That DDI remain Executive Agent for the Operations Center; that the DDI Duty Officer be senior in non-duty hours.
- b. That DDS&T and DDM&S place duty officers in the present Operations Center, at least during off-duty hours.
- c. That each Directorate duty officer be responsible for activities of and alerting in his Directorate. (For relations with other centers see Annex D.) That the DDI Duty Officer normally be responsible for the needs of the DCI and DDCI in non-duty hours.
- d. That during crisis periods a senior Agency duty officer representing the DCI be placed over the four Directorate duty officers.

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- e. That the OC complex make available to the Directorate duty officers all incoming narrative traffic received by the Agency (after screening out low precedence and administrative cables); that each message be seen by at least one duty officer; that the duty officers maintain necessary compartmentation; that exceptions to this provision be permitted only by specific direction of the DCI or his Deputies.
- f. That State NODIS traffic, the only important category not usually received electrically, be routed through the appropriate duty officers in the Operations Center by LDX, if State will agree.
- g. That the alerting and "call-in" functions of the OC complex, including those on behalf of DDS&T, be transferred to the appropriate Directorate duty officers in the Operations Center.

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- h. That all selection, including that by the OC Complex, be moved to the Operations Center; that the volume of cables selected be reduced; that the Night Journal and Cable Summary be combined, and issued on an all-source basis 2 or 3 times daily.
- i. That to the extent possible with present facilities all dissemination of electrical narrative traffic within the Headquarters Building be transferred to the OC Complex.
- j. That approximately square feet of additional space adjacent to the Operations Center be made available as soon as possible.
- k. If this space is on the 6th floor, that a connecting staircase be constructed as soon as arrangements can be made.
- l. That the Agency obtain inter-Agency agreement on NIOC.

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19. While these steps are underway, study should begin on the following problems in the design of a future Operations Center.

- a. Should FMSAC and SSOC be physically consolidated with the Operations Center?
- b.

[REDACTED]
- c. How should the Agency, or NIOC, manage the interaction of collection systems?
- d. How to adapt CDS to an Operations Center fully meeting the objectives of Paragraph 2, and make it compatible with the systems of the WHSR, NMCC, and State Operations Center?

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20. The additional space (paragraph 18j) will make it possible to move into Phase II. In Phase II we assume that NIOC has been approved. Thus the additional space will be used for:

- a. Offices and communications for inter-Directorate and inter-Agency crisis task forces.

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- b. Offices for State, DIA, and NSA permanent representatives.
- c. Moving the IW into the Operations Center, where its officers can be more aware of current priorities.

21. Phase III is based on CDS and the consolidation of computer operations. The design of a modern Operations Center should take into account the studies proposed in Paragraph 19, the requirements of NIOC, the evolution of the Agency, and the advance of technology in the meanwhile. At the least, we should attempt to develop now the design of an information handling system and the requirements for space and personnel that a modern center would require. We should establish FY76 as a target for such a center, and move steadily toward it.

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